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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being used in various daily tasks such as
object detection, speech processing, and machine translation. However, it is
known that DNNs suffer from robustness problems — perturbed inputs called
adversarial samples leading to misbehaviors of DNNs. In this paper, we pro-
pose a black-box technique called Black-box Momentum Iterative Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (BMI-FGSM) to test the robustness of DNN models. The
technique does not require any knowledge of the structure or weights of the
target DNN. Compared to existing white-box testing techniques that require
accessing model internal information such as gradients, our technique ap-
proximates gradients through Differential Evolution and uses approximated
gradients to construct adversarial samples. Experimental results show that
our technique can achieve 100% success in generating adversarial samples
to trigger misclassification, and over 95% success in generating samples to
trigger misclassification to a specific target output label. It also demon-
strates better perturbation distance and better transferability. Compared to
the state-of-the-art black-box technique, our technique is more efficient. Fur-
thermore, we conduct testing on the commercial Aliyun API and successfully
trigger its misbehavior within a limited number of queries, demonstrating the
feasibility of real-world black-box attack.
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1. Introduction
In the past few years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) (LeCun et al., 2015)
have achieved great success in many important applications, such as image
classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), speech processing (Sak et al., 2015)
and machine translation (Bahdanau et al., 2014). Their efficacy even out-
performs humans. Modern software applications increasingly include DNNs
as a critical component, exampled by autonomous software (Bojarski et al.,
2016), Apple face ID 1, and Amazon Echo 2. It can be envisioned that DNN
model engineering will become an essential step in the software development
lifecycle. As such, testing and debugging DNN models is of importance.
However, researchers have revealed that DNNs have robustness problems.
That is, they are vulnerable to adversarial samples, i.e., benign inputs that
add small and imperceptible perturbation and cause DNNs to misclassify.
Adversarial samples hinder the utilization of DNNs in safety-critical systems,
especially those related to computer vision, including face recognition (Sharif
et al., 2019), self-driving vehicles (Evtimov et al., 2018) and medical analy-
sis (Litjens et al., 2017). To DNN based applications, adversarial samples are
threats but also a method to test DNN models. Our work falls into efficiently
and effectively generating adversarial samples to expose robustness problems
of DNNs.
Adversarial sample generation methods (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Carlini et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2017; Su et al., 2019; Chen et
al., 2017) have two categories: white-box techniques and black-box techniques.
The former requires access to model internals such as model structure, neu-
ron weight values, and gradients. In contrast, the latter treats the subject
model as a black box and does not require access to model internals, but
rather just model outputs. Black-box techniques have broader applicability.
They can be used to test remote applications powered by underlying DNNs.
For example, internet service providers such as Alibaba Cloud 3 and Google
Cloud 4 offer pay-for-use APIs, which hide the internal details from users so
that white-box techniques are not applicable. As such, black-box techniques
are necessary.
1https://machinelearning.apple.com/2017/11/16/face-detection.html
2https://developer.amazon.com/alexa/science
3https://www.alibabacloud.com/
4https://cloud.google.com/
2
Figure 1: Our proposed black-box BMI-FGSM on ImageNet samples. All adversarial sam-
ples are misclassified by target DNN (Perturbations are magnified for better visualization).
In this paper, we develop a new black-box adversarial sample generation
method in image classification. For a subject model, we only assume access
to model inputs and outputs. Our approach called Black-box Momentum
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (BMI-FGSM) then modifies the original
inputs to trigger model misclassification. It aims to achieve the goal with
as little mutation as possible, utilizing Differential Evolution (Storn et al.,
1997) to approximate gradient direction, and leveraging double step size and
candidate reuse to improve efficiency, which will be explained later.
We compare BMI-FGSM with other state-of-the-art white-box and black-
box techniques in both the untargeted setting (i.e., misclassifying to any out-
put label) and the targeted setting (i.e., misclassifying to a specific output
label). We also consider the transferability, that is, whether an adversarial
sample generated for one model can be used to trigger misbehavior of an-
other model. The experiments on a set of widely used datasets and models
show that our proposed BMI-FGSM can achieve a high success rate in both
untargeted and targeted settings, comparable or even better than white-box
methods. Our approach can generate an adversarial sample within half a
minute, faster than other black-box techniques. Finally, we apply our ap-
proach to a real-world image recognition system and expose its robustness
problem.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
• We propose a novel black-box adversarial sample generation method
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named BMI-FGSM. This technique does not require knowledge about
model architecture, weight values, or gradients.
• We propose two novel methods to improve performance, double step
size to enlarge exploration distance and candidate reuse to approximate
momentum that provides guidance for input perturbation, which is
critical for generating effective adversarial samples.
• We compare BMI-FGSM with the state-of-the-art methods. Experi-
mental results on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets show
that our approach is more efficient than the black-box method ZOO (Chen
et al., 2017) and has a comparable success rate as the white-box method
MI-FGSM (Dong et al., 2018). Furthermore, we use BMI-FGSM to test
the commercial Aliyun Image Recognition API and successfully trigger
misbehavior.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
existing research related to adversarial samples. Section 3 presents our black-
box test case generation technique. Section 4 posts three research questions
and then answers them with experiments. Section 5 presents the conclusions
and future work.
2. Related work
Existing works on the DNN robustness problem and adversarial sample
generation method in image classification will be reviewed in the following
subsections.
2.1. DNN robustness
Robustness is critical to the application of DNNs. A popular approach
to improving model robustness is to provide additional training and valida-
tion data. There are mainly two ways of generating additional data, data
augmentation (Zhong et al., 2017; Perez et al., 2017) and using Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2018).
The former augments training dataset by transforming original data, e.g.,
move, rotate, flip, and scale an image to produce new ones. A GAN model
is composed of a generator and a discriminator. The generator takes ran-
dom input and tries to mutate it to a valid input, while the discriminator
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determines if the mutated one looks like a real input. The two parts com-
pete with each other and ideally the generator would learn to generate real
samples. However, existing data augmentation techniques and GANs have
limited effectiveness. Hence, a more practical method to gauge and improve
DNN robustness is through adversarial samples. Specifically, original input
samples are perturbed to generate adversarial samples to trigger model mis-
classification. The training set can be enhanced with the adversarial samples
to retrain the DNN model to improve robustness (Tramer et al., 2017; Madry
et al., 2017). With adversarial training, DNNs are expected to be less sensi-
tive to noises or perturbations.
2.2. Adversarial sample generation
Adversarial sample generation methods can be categorized into white-box
methods and black-box methods.
White-box methods assume full knowledge of the target DNN, such as
model architecture and neuron weights. Szegedy et al. (2013) observed that
adding small perturbations to input images can cause DNN model misclassi-
fication and converted the generation of adversarial samples to a constrained
minimization problem. Goodfellow et al. (2015) proposed “fast gradient sign
method” (FGSM), a gradient-based method aiming at a very short generation
time. Kurakin et al. (2016) proposed a basic iterative method to generate
more powerful samples. Dong et al. (2018) introduced momentum and pro-
posed “momentum iterative fast gradient sign method” (MI-FGSM) to fur-
ther balance the trade-off between success rate and transferability. Carlini
et al. (2017) proposed the C&W method, an optimization-based technique
systematically builds examples by directly optimizing the perturbation with
an Adam optimizer. Additional proposed mechanisms include binary search
and change of variable space.
Black-box methods assume no access to model internals. Instead, they
can query the target model by sending inputs and observe the correspond-
ing outputs. Compared with white-box techniques, black-box methods can
be used to perform testing to third-party models and have much broader
applicability. Papernot et al. (2017) assumed no internal information and
insufficient training data, and proposed to train a substitute model with a
small synthetic training dataset. Narodytska et al. (2017) discovered the
phenomenon that is merely modifying a single pixel might lead to model
misclassification. Su et al. (2019) exposed DNN robustness problems by
leveraging Differential Evolution to search for this kind of pixel. Chen et al.
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(2017) proposed Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO), a derivative-free genera-
tion method. The authors exploited a finite differencing method to calculate
the approximate gradient by analyzing two very close points in the loss func-
tion.
Another type of DNN robustness testing is the transferability testing
(or no-box method) (Szegedy et al., 2013; Moosavi et al., 2017). These
techniques do not query the target model, neither do they generate any
samples. Instead, they use adversarial samples produced by another model
to test the target DNN. The underlying assumption is that if an adversarial
sample can confuse a model, it is likely that it is equally confusing for another
model. Therefore, transferability can be considered an important quality
metric of generalization for the adversarial test cases.
We aim at developing a black-box adversarial sample generation method
that features high success rate, high transferability, and cost-effectiveness.
Many parallel works have also studied the problem of black-box adversarial
generation, but our work remains unique in the approach. Ilyas et al. (2018)
uses a natural evolution strategy (which can be seen as a finite differences
estimate on a random gaussian basis) to estimate the gradients for use in the
projected gradient descent method. Following this work, Ilyas et al. (2019)
formalizes the gradient estimation problem and develop a bandit optimization
framework incorporating time and data-dependent information, to generate
black-box adversarial samples. In the same threat model, we leverage Differ-
ential Evolution to approximate gradient sign to convert a white-box iterative
gradient-based method to its black-box version that only requires accessing
model outputs. Alzantot et al (2019) develops a gradient-free approach for
generating adversarial examples by leveraging genetic optimization, where
the fitness function is defined similarly to CW loss, using prediction scores
from the black-box model. The authors adopt dimensionality reduction and
adaptive parameter scaling for boosting gradient-free optimization. In con-
trast, our approach models the gradient sign, combining with our double step
size and candidate reuse strategies enables attacks that can reliably gener-
ate adversarial samples. Another line of work aims to generate adversarial
samples in different scenarios. Cheng et al. (2019) focuses on the label-only
setting and propose a generic optimization algorithm, which can be applied
to discrete and non-continuous models other than neural networks, such as
the decision tree. Suya et al. (2019) simulates a scenario where the attacker
has access to a large pool of seed inputs and proposes a hybrid strategy that
combines optimization-based and transferability-based methods.
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2.3. Testing DNNs
Compared with traditional software, the behavior of a Deep Learning
(DL) system is determined by the structure and weights of DNNs. The di-
mension and test space of DNN is often larger. DeepXplore (Pei et al., 2017)
proposes a white-box differential testing algorithm for systematically finding
inputs that can trigger different behaviors between multiple DNNs. They
propose neuron coverage for systematically measuring the parts of a DNN
exercised by test inputs. Tensorfuzz (Odena et al., 2018) provides coverage-
guided fuzzing methods for neural network by using the approximate near-
est neighbor algorithm. DeepTest (Tian et al., 2018) generates test cases
that maximize the numbers of activated neurons and finds erroneous be-
haviors under different realistic driving conditions (e.g., blurring, rain, and
fog). DeepGauge (Ma et al., 2018) proposes multi-granularity testing cov-
erage for DL systems based on the internal state of DNN. Their testing
criteria are scalable to complex DNNs. DeepCT (Ma et al., 2019) adapts
the notion of combinatorial testing and introduces a set of coverage crite-
ria based on neuron input interactions for each layer of DNNs to guide test
generation towards balancing the defect detection ability and the number of
tests. DeepCover (Sun et al., 2018) proposes a set of four test criteria for
DNNs, inspired by the MC/DC test criteria in traditional software. They
evaluate the proposed test criteria on small scale neural networks and show
a higher defect detection ability than random testing. DeepMutation (Ma et
al., 2018) adapts the concept of mutation testing and proposes a mutation
testing framework specialized for DNNs to measure the quality of test data.
They believe that mutation testing is a promising technique that helps to
generate higher quality test data.
Existing works on testing the DL system detect erroneous behaviors of
DNNs under realistic circumstances (e.g., lighting, occlusion), and mostly fo-
cus on testing criteria, which requires DNNs to be transparent. In contrast,
adversarial sample generation demonstrates a particular type of erroneous
behavior of DNNs. Our proposed method tests black-box DL systems with
adversarial samples that are indistinguishable from the original ones, to ex-
pose misbehaviors from the attacker’s perspective.
3. BMI-FGSM algorithm
Our technique, called Black-box Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method (BMI-FGSM), is inspired by iterative gradient-based methods and
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Figure 2: Basic framework of the Black-box Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method.
Differential Evolution. It features mechanisms to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of generation. Figure 2 is the basic framework of our method.
Given a clean input image and a pre-trained DNN, Differential Evolution
first derives a gradient sign population, children candidates compete with
their parents using the corresponding perturbed inputs. Then, we perturb
the inputs with the approximate gradient signs. The process repeats until
an adversarial sample very similar to the benign input is produced.
In the following sections, iterative gradient-based methods are first in-
troduced, and Differential Evolution is presented, followed by the complete
algorithm with two improvement mechanisms double step size and candidate
reuse.
3.1. Iterative gradient-based methods
Throughout this paper, we focus on a n-classifier DNN model (LeCun
et al., 1998) of image classification task where I ∈ Rm is the input image
and F (I) ∈ Rn is the n-dimension output that denotes the predicted labels.
More formally, we define a DNN as follows
F (I) = softmax(Z(I)) (1)
C(I) = argmaxi{Fi(I)} (2)
Here, Z(I) is computed by hidden layers and a set of neuron weight ma-
trices, known as the logits. The softmax function normalizes the output so
F (I) denotes the probability distribution of the predicted labels i.e. Fi(I) ∈
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[0, 1] ∧∑i Fi(I) = 1, where Fi(I) is the probability that input I belongs to
label i. Thus the final classification label C(I) is the label with the highest
probability.
During the black-box adversarial sample generation, we assume the DNN
model is pre-trained and fixed (i.e., neuron weight values are fixed). We
assume access to the input image, output label, and output confidence, which
is common for black-box methods. We do not assume any access to the
structure, neuron weights, or intermediate outputs. Given a clean input I
and its ground-truth label y, we call Iadv an adversarial sample if
C(Iadv) 6= y ∧ ‖Iadv − I‖p ≤  (untargeted) (3)
C(Iadv) = q ∧ q 6= y ∧ ‖Iadv − I‖p ≤  (targeted) (4)
where in untargeted setting sample is misclassified to any false label and in
targeted setting sample misclassified to a specific false label q. A threshold
 controls the perturbation magnitude by limiting the Lp-norm distance.
Iterative gradient-based methods are white-box generation methods that
iteratively calculate the gradient and perturb the input. These methods
feature high efficiency, success rate, and extensibility, usually require a small
number of back propagations to craft adversarial samples in the L∞ neighbor-
hood of the original input. For example, the basic iterative method (Kurakin
et al., 2016) produces adversarial sample by applying gradient T times with
a small step size:
It = It−1 +

T
· sign(∇It−1J(F (It−1), y)) (5)
where ∇ represents the gradient and J(·) is the cost function. It can finish
the generation fast and yield superior results, also known as the “iterative
fast gradient sign method”. To further balance the trade-off between success
rate and transferability, an improved version of the basic iterative method
introduces momentum (Dong et al., 2018) by replacing the raw gradient with
an accumulated gradient gt:
gt = µ · gt−1 + ∇It−1J(F (It−1), y)∥∥∇It−1J(F (It−1), y)∥∥1 (6)
The critical step of iterative gradient-based methods is the gradient com-
putation. In white-box attacks, gradients are usually computed by back
9
Figure 3: Visualization of two candidates in Differential Evolution. White pixels denote
the corresponding matrix elements are 1. (a) a candidate in the initial population x(0);
(b) a candidate in the last population x(G).
propagation.
3.2. Differential Evolution
Differential Evolution (DE) (Storn et al., 1997) is an evolutionary algo-
rithm to solve optimization problems. DE tries to find the input that best
fits the objective through input mutation. It has three phases: evolution,
crossover, and selection. During the phases of evolution and crossover, new
children candidate solutions are generated. In selection, by comparing chil-
dren with their parents, the ones with better fitness survive and are chosen
for the next iteration of evolution. DE has the following advantages: (i) DE
algorithm is independent of DNN, and hence any improvements of DE (Das et
al., 2011, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009) are also directly applicable. (ii) DE solves
non-differentiable, noisy, and dynamic problems such that it can handle both
continuous and discontinuous problems without requiring understanding in-
ternal structure of the problems. (iii) DE has a heuristic-based diversity
insurance mechanism which can prevent from being trapped in local maxima
and minima while standard greedy search and gradient descent often cannot.
In our algorithm, we employ DE to search for the gradient sign. Denote
I ∈ Rm as the input image, y as the ground-truth label, F (I) ∈ Rn as the
outputs of DNN. We initialize the first generation x(0) as follows.
x(0) = {xi(0)|xij(0) = random{−1, 1}; 1 ≤ i ≤ N ; 1 ≤ j ≤ m} (7)
where xi(0) denotes the gradient signs with the same size as I, and is the
i-th candidate of the 0-th generation. Variable xij(0) is the j-th feature
randomly initialized with 1 or -1. N is the size of population (i.e, the number
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of candidates in a generation). Figure 3(a) visualizes a candidate in x(0).
The candidate is essentially a matrix of the same size as the input image.
The evolution and crossover at the g-th generation is defined as follows.
vi(g + 1) = sign(xr1(g) +DR · (xr2(g)− xr3(g))) (i 6= r1 6= r2 6= r3) (8)
uij(g + 1) =
{
vij(g + 1) rand(0, 1) < CR
xij(g) otherwise
(9)
where DR denotes the scaling factor of differential vector, CR ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the crossover probability to control crossover variants. Intuitively, Eq. 8
denotes that a mutant vi(g + 1) is derived from three randomly selected
candidates from the previous generaion x(g), denoted by the three random
numbers r1, r2, and r3. We assign a sign function because it returns only
two valid values representing two different gradient directions, and leads to
fast convergence. Eq. 9 denotes that an offspring ui(g + 1) is formed by
recombining the mutant with the previous candidate, and uij(g + 1) is the
j-th feature of ui(g + 1).
Next, compare fitness of x(g) and u(g + 1) to determine the next gener-
ation x(g + 1). However, it is hard to set a fitness function for candidates
since they represent gradient signs, so we convert candidates to a set of per-
turbed images first (Eq. 5, replace sign(·) with candidate), and then apply
the fitness function. For the DNNs we test, although making the confidence
of y as fitness works acceptably well, we ultimately settle on this following
fitness function.
f(I ′) =
{
Fy(I
′)−maxi 6=y{Fi(I ′)} untargeted
maxi 6=q{Fi(I ′)} − Fq(I ′) targeted
(10)
The lower the f(I ′), the higher fitness value an input I ′ has. This fitness
function aims to suppress the probability of the ground-truth label while
enhancing the maximum probability among other false labels. Figure 3(b)
visualizes one of the candidates which have evolved G generations. We can
observe the pattern that serves as approximate gradient signs.
3.3. Black-box Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
Using DE, we leverage Algorithm 1 to approximate the gradient signs.
Children candidates are generated by Eq. 8 and Eq. 9. We cannot directly
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Algorithm 1 Approximate gradient signs
Input: base sample I, generation x(0), perturbation distance α, DE iterations G;
Output: last generation x(G);
1: I(0)⇐ I + α · x(0);
2: for g = 0 : G− 1 do
3: Generate next generation u(g + 1) from x(g);
4: I(g + 1)⇐ I + α · u(g + 1);
5: Compare f(I(g)) with f(I(g + 1)) and select x(g + 1);
6: end for
7: return last generation x(G);
Algorithm 2 BMI-FGSM
Input: clean example I0, population size N , perturbation distance , DE iterations G,
iterative gradient-based method iterations T , candidate keeping rate KR;
Output: adversarial sample IT ;
1: Initialize N candidates x(0)
2: α⇐ 
3: β ⇐ /T
4: for t = 0 : T − 1 do
5: x(G)⇐ ApproxGradientSigns(It, x(0), α,G);
6: I(G)⇐ It + β · x(G);
7: It+1 ⇐ argmin
i∈I(G)
f(i);
8: Keep candidates of bestKR∗100%∗N fitness in x(G) and initialize other candidates;
9: x(0)⇐ x(G);
10: α⇐ α− β;
11: end for
12: return adversarial sample IT ;
compare candidates, so we convert candidates to perturbed images (line 4).
The perturbed images’ fitness values are compared to determine the offspring
using Eq. 10. Candidate with the lowest fitness score of x(G) is the final
approximate gradient signs. Note that in black-box testing, the additional
overhead by DE is inevitable because in white-box testing the “exact gradient
signs” can be computed by back propagation in milliseconds. Note that in
the black-box attack context, precise estimation of gradient signs is neither
possible nor necessary.
We then extend our work to BMI-FGSM, an algorithm inheriting the
advantages of both DE and iterative gradient-based method. As shown in
Algorithm 2, the loop denotes the main procedure of the iterative gradient-
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Figure 4: An example of double step size. (a) no double step size; (b) double step size.
based method. After approximating gradient signs with a base sample It, we
apply x(G) to It again and generate perturbed images I(G), the next base
sample It+1 will be the fittest one of I(G). After T iterations, image IT is
returned as the adversarial sample. The most challenging part of BMI-FGSM
is to escape local optimums and re-gain momentum for better results. Hence,
we design two mechanisms called double step size and candidate reuse.
3.3.1. Double Step Size
There are two types of perturbations in our proposed BMI-FGSM. The
first one happens in approximate gradient signs (Algorithm 1, line 4). It is a
“temporary perturbation” in which we always perturb the same base sample
I, and generate a set of temporary images I(g+1) for fitness evaluation. The
other one is in the loop of iterative gradient-based method (Algorithm 2, line
6). It is the “permanent perturbation” in which we iteratively perturb the
clean image from I0 to IT .
Either perturbation requires a perturbation distance, usually it is /T ,
but there would be a problem if we just use the same distance — the DE
loop would evaluate candidates using temporary images that are perturbed
with a very small distance. The DE procedure hence runs the risk of being
stuck in some local optima. Note that the white-box version of iterative
gradient-based method does not suffer from this step size problem as they
always calculate exact gradient signs by back propagation.
As a result, we design the double step size: exploiting two distances for
different perturbations. Specifically, α initialized with  is for gradient signs
calculation, and β initialized with /T is for the permanent perturbation. At
the end of iteration t, we have perturbed It to It+1 with a distance β, and
hence decreased the exploration distance by updating α ← α − β to satisfy
13
Figure 5: An example of candidate reuse.
α+t·β ≡ , where parameter  is still the only overall perturbation distance of
adversarial sample. Figure 4 shows the difference with and without double
step size. The circle area denotes local optima. Points I∗ represent the
movement of permanent perturbations. Points I ′∗ denote the best position
that DE can find. Without double step size, perturbations are short-sighted
so that the path would be trapped for a while. With double step size, we
can explore further and hence guide the procedure to escape from the local
optima area.
Intuitively, the double step size enables us to use a more considerable per-
turbation distance when approximating gradient signs. Dynamic exploration
distance enlarges the potential to achieve better fitness. With the assistance
of double step size, we improve the success rate of sample generation on
ImageNet.
3.3.2. Candidate Reuse
In the training of DNNs, momentum (Polyak et al., 1964) is introduced
to improve gradient descent. Using accumulated gradients rather than the
raw gradients helps escape local optima and converge fast. Researchers in
the white-box MI-FGSM project (Dong et al., 2018) leverage this idea and
integrate momentum in their techniques. Accumulated gradient balances
the trade-off between transferability and perturbation distance, producing
high-quality adversarial samples. But according to our tests, the way of con-
structing an accumulated gradient cannot be directly ported to our method
for two reasons: (i) The accumulation of approximate gradient signs also
means the accumulation of errors. (ii) Candidates have only two valid values
1 and -1, so the accumulated gradient Eq. 6 is not appropriate.
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We design a novel mechanism candidate reuse to achieve effect similar to
gradient accumulation. Specifically, while generation x(G) holds N candidate
gradients, our technique saves the best KR ∗ 100% ∗N candidates as part of
the initial population of next round, where KR is the keeping rate. Figure 5
gives an example of how candidate reuse works. The reused candidates that
carry previous iterations’ gradient infomation, participate in the evolution
and play the role of “momentum”. The candidate reuse method is more
practical in the black-box attack context than the accumulated gradient.
Applying candidate reuse, we make BMI-FGSM available on ImageNet.
4. Experiments
We use an Intel Xeon E5 CPU and an Nvidia Tesla K80 GPU for all
model trainings and sample generations. We aim to answer the following
three research questions:
• RQ1: How does BMI-FGSM perform compared with existing methods?
• RQ2: How is the transferability of BMI-FGSM?
• RQ3: How do double step size and candidate reuse improve BMI-FGSM
on large model and dataset?
• RQ4: How dose BMI-FGSM perform testing third-party applications?
We first report that BMI-FGSM is substantially faster than existing black-
box techniques and achieves comparable performance with existing white-
box methods. Then, we show that the two novel mechanisms do improve
performance. Finally, we present the results of generating adversarial samples
on a third-party system: the Aliyun Image Recognition API.
4.1. RQ1: Performance Comparison
4.1.1. Dataset and Models
For the MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al.,
2009) datasets. We randomly choose 100 images for evaluation and sample
10 images from each class. For each image, we apply one untargeted attack
and nine targeted generations for the nine other classes. Thus there are 100
untargeted samples and 900 targeted samples in total for each dataset.
The target DNN models we used are based on the settings of Carlini and
Wagner (Carlini et al. (2017), Table 1). We train and get 99% accuracy
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Table 1: Evaluation of adversarial sample generation methods on MNIST.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
Success Avg. dist Avg. time Success Avg. dist Avg. time
C&W 100.0% - 33.4 sec 100.0% - 34.0 sec
MI-FGSM 100.0% 0.195 0.1 sec 100.0% 0.247 0.2 sec
ZOO 100.0% - 68.4 sec 97.8% - 87.4 sec
BMI-FGSM 100.0% 0.227 16.7 sec 98.2% 0.314 23.7 sec
for MNIST and 84% accuracy for CIFAR10. Data were normalized before
classification. Misclassified clean images are ignored during generation.
4.1.2. Comparison Methods
On MNIST and CIFAR10, our proposed BMI-FGSM is compared with
three state-of-the-art adversarial sample generation techniques C&W (Carlini
et al., 2017), ZOO (Chen et al., 2017) and MI-FGSM (Dong et al., 2018) in
both untargeted and targeted settings. For all comparison methods, we refer
to the code implementation of Foolbox5 with necessary modifications.
• C&W (Carlini et al. (2017), white-box, optimization-based, L2-norm)
builds examples by directly optimizing the perturbation with an opti-
mizer.
• ZOO (Chen et al. (2017), black-box, optimizaiton-based, L2-norm) ex-
ploits finite difference method to calculate approximate gradient.
• MI-FGSM (Dong et al. (2018), white-box, gradient-based, L∞-norm)
introduces momentum to improve the basic iterative method.
4.1.3. Parameters
For C&W, we conduct 9 binary searches for the best scale parameter c
starting from 0.01. We use η = 0.01, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 for the Adam
optimizer. The confidence k = 10 for robustness and the max perturbation
distance is set to 20. We run 1000 iterations for both MNIST and CIFAR10.
The optimization terminates if the loss does not decrease after each tenth
of the iterations. For ZOO, we use a batch size of 128 i.e., evaluate 128
5https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
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Table 2: Evaluation of adversarial sample generation methods on CIFAR10.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
Success Avg. dist Avg. time Success Avg. dist Avg. time
C&W 100.0% - 11.3 sec 100.0% - 12.7 sec
MI-FGSM 100.0% 0.020 <0.1 sec 100.0% 0.035 <0.1 sec
ZOO 100.0% - 143.9 sec 94.8% - 189.4 sec
BMI-FGSM 100.0% 0.034 20.6 sec 96.3% 0.047 30.4 sec
Figure 6: Visualization of the adversarial samples on MNIST and CIFAR10.
gradients and update 128 pixels at each step. The ZOO attack is based
on C&W’s framework, so we keep the setting consistent with C&W except
running 3000 iterations for MNIST and 1000 iterations for CIFAR10.
For MI-FGSM, we set the maximum iterations T = 40 for MNIST and
T = 20 for CIFAR10, and use a step size /T = 0.01 per iteration. The
upper bounds of perturbation distance are 0.4 and 0.05, respectively. The
decay factor µ = 1. We check the adversarial sample at the end of each
iteration and return early if it successfully causes misclassification. For our
BMI-FGSM, we set DR = 1, CR = 0.9, N = 100, KR = 0.2. In the case of
MNIST, we set  = 0.4, T = 40, G = 50. In the case of CIFAR10, we set
 = 0.2, T = 20, G = 100. Early return is activated.
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Table 3: Evaluation of transfer rate on MNIST.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
FC LeNet5 FC LeNet5
C&W 2.0% 5.0% 6.0% 11.0%
MI-FGSM 30.0% 20.0% 42.2% 45.4%
ZOO 3.0% 1.0% 3.1% 0.2%
BMI-FGSM 38.0% 36.0% 39.2% 24.0%
4.1.4. Results
We report the success rate, average perturbation distance, and time for
the four methods on MNIST and CIFAR10 in Table 1 and Table 2, respec-
tively. From column 2, we can observe that all methods achieve 100% success
rates in the untargeted setting. From column 5, The success rate of our ap-
proach in the targeted setting is over 95%, which is higher than the black-box
ZOO. In terms of the perturbation distance in columns 3 and 6, we ignore
the results of C&W and ZOO because they optimize L2-norm distance while
MI-FGSM and BMI-FGSM use L∞-norm. BMI-FGSM shows very close per-
turbation distance to the MI-FGSM, that is, our black-box method generates
samples with similar quality as the white-box method. Columns 4 and col-
umn 7 illustrate the time cost. Our black-box approach can generates a
valid adversarial sample within about 20 seconds for untargeted attacks and
30 seconds for targeted attacks, which is more efficient than the black-box
ZOO. Note that our approach is an iterative gradient-based method, which
is originally designed for fast sample generation.
Overall, our approach features high success rate and high efficiency. Fig-
ure 6 visualizes some generated adversarial samples. We can observe that
BMI-FGSM is able to generate images that show a similar visual impression
as original images. These malicious samples with imperceptible distortion to
human eyes confuse DNNs with high accuracy.
4.2. RQ2: Transferability
Transferability indicates the cross-model usability of adversarial samples.
We evaluate the transferability on MNIST and CIFAR10. We define the
transfer rate to be the percentage of transferable adversarial samples gener-
ated in Section 4.1, i.e., samples that can trigger the misbehavior of another
model.
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Table 4: Evaluation of transfer rate on CIFAR10.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
AllConv NiN VGG16 AllConv NiN VGG16
C&W 12.9% 8.2% 16.5% 18.8% 11.8% 18.8%
MI-FGSM 26.8% 19.4% 31.6% 46.7% 38.3% 55.2%
ZOO 11.8% 9.4% 10.6% 22.1% 11.7% 14.3%
BMI-FGSM 21.5% 14.5% 18.4% 25.4% 22.8% 20.1%
In the case of MNIST, we train a simple FC network (3x fully connected
layers) and a LeNet5 (LeCun et al., 1998) as targets. In the case of CIFAR10,
we train an All Convolution Network (AllConv) (Springenberg et al., 2014),
a Network in Network (NiN) (Lin et al., 2013) and a VGG16 (Simonyan et
al., 2015) network as targets. All models above are kept as similar as possible
to their original framework with minor modifications at the softmax layer to
fit the output.
4.2.1. Results
We report the transferability in Table 3 and Table 4. Values in the table
denote the transfer success rate, represent the generalization of the adversar-
ial samples generated by different methods. We can observe that adversarial
samples created by gradient-based methods (MI-FGSM, BMI-FGSM) have
a higher transfer rate than those by optimization-based methods (C&W,
ZOO). The optimization-based methods must tolerate larger perturbation
distance in order to obtain higher transferability. Besides, our proposed
BMI-FGSM takes advantage of momentum, which is introduced for balancing
success rate and transferability, achieving a comparable score to white-box
MI-FGSM. The transferability of our approach is higher than the black-box
ZOO method on both MNIST and CIFAR10.
4.3. RQ3: Strategies on Large Dataset
Modern image classification applications may have a larger dataset and a
complex model. Attacks in such settings are challenging and expensive due
to the large input space. We evaluate the performance and transferability
of four methods on the large ImageNet dataset. Then, we study the efficacy
of our proposed two mechanisms, double step size and candidate reuse, by
generating an image with a hard limit of iterations.
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Table 5: Adversarial sample generation on ImageNet.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
Success Avg. dist Avg. time Success Avg. dist Avg. time
C&W 100.0% - 8.2 min 98.6% - 12.0 min
MI-FGSM 98.6% 0.003 <0.1 min 98.6% 0.005 0.1 min
ZOO 98.6% - 18.1 min 21.6% - 230.9 min
BMI-FGSM 98.6% 0.025 7.4 min 93.2% 0.046 19.5 min
Table 6: Transfer rate on ImageNet.
Methods
Untargeted Targeted
InceptionV3 ResNet101 InceptionV3 ResNet101
C&W 16.2% 14.9% 15.1% 13.7%
MI-FGSM 11.0% 12.3% 11.0% 9.6%
ZOO 37.0% 37.0% 25.0% 31.3%
BMI-FGSM 28.8% 30.1% 29.0% 33.3%
We randomly choose 100 images from ImageNet validation set (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) and apply one untargeted and one targeted generation for each
image. Thus there are 100 untargeted samples and 100 targeted samples in
total. We use VGG16 (Simonyan et al., 2015) as the target model, Incep-
tionV3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) and ResNet101 (He et al., 2016) as the transfer
models. We adapt the CIFAR10 parameter settings in Section 4.1. For un-
targeted setting, an adversarial sample is valid only when its ground-truth
label not in the top-5 prediction.
4.3.1. Results
Table 5 demonstrates the performance and Table 6 shows the transfer-
ability. Our proposed BMI-FGSM achieves a success rate of 98.6% in the
untargeted setting, 93.2% in targeted setting. Compared with the white-box
technique MI-FGSM, our approach has a higher perturbation distance due to
large scale input images, and hence more gradients need to be approximated.
Compared with the black-box ZOO, our approach significantly reduces time
consumption and generates more transferable samples. We plot some of our
generated samples in Figure 1. All are hard to distinguish from the original
samples.
The effect of different strategies is illustrated in Table 7. Observe that
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Table 7: Different strategies comparison on ImageNet.
Strategy Success rate Avg. dist First valid
BMI-FGSM 98.6% 0.025 861
No double step size 70.3% 0.021 808
No candidate reuse 0% - -
Perturbed images as population 63.5% 0.020 797
Figure 7: Confidence of ground-truth versus iterations.
the average distance and the first valid iteration (the iteration where the first
successful adversarial sample was found) have no evident distinction, while
the success rates change noticeably – the success rate decreases by about
28% without double step size. The algorithm is almost unusable without
candidate reuse. We also evaluate an alternative that uses the perturbed
images as the population rather than gradient sign, while keeping everything
else the same. Observe that the success rate decrease as well, suggesting
incompatibility. This result indicates that new strategies are surely needed
to apply this alternative.
To further investigate the advantages of double step size and candidate
reuse, we set a hard T × G = 2000 iterations and report the confidence of
ground-truth label versus iterations in Figure 7. The lower ground-truth label
confidence, the higher attack ability of sample. The curve of no candidate
reuse ends at about 0.99 shows the importance of momentum information.
The curve of no double step size ends at about 0.55 because a single short
21
Table 8: Comparison of testing techniques on ImageNet.
Strategy Success rate Avg. dist
Random 0% -
Tensorfuzz 31.1% 0.046
BMI-FGSM 98.6% 0.025
perturbation distance runs the risk of being trapped in some local optima.
In contrast, the dashed curve that indicates the best temporary perturbed
images when approximate gradient signs drop quickly, and guide BMI-FGSM
to achieve lower confidence of 0.05. With all the techniques applied, BMI-
FGSM is able to generate visually undetectable adversarial samples that
effectively suppress the probability of ground-truth label.
Adversarial samples represent a particular type of misbehavior of the DL
system. To illustrate the ability of BMI-FGSM to test the robustness of
DNN, we use random testing without coverage guidance and Tensorfuzz 6
with coverage guidance as baselines of DNN testing techniques. Table 8
reports the performance of different methods in generating untargeted ad-
versarial samples. Observe that our approach outperforms random testing
and Tensorfuzz, which means BMI-FGSM is more appropriate for robustness
testing of adversarial attacks.
4.4. RQ4: Testing third-party API
In order to validate the reliability and applicability of our method to
third-party applications, we test the Aliyun Image Recognition API 7, a
commercial computer vision toolkit powered by Alibaba Cloud. The API
is a n-way classifier that can be queried and outputs label-score pairs for a
given image, without any internal details. Our goal is to perform adversarial
sample generation to trigger black-box API misbehavior. However, testing
Aliyun API is more challenging than that on a common black-box model
because of the following reasons: (i) The Aliyun API provides a free trial
of 5000 queries. After that, it costs about $1.5 per 5000 queries. From the
perspective of the attacker, a query-efficient adversarial generation algorithm
is highly desirable. (ii) The number of classes is even larger, but we do not
6https://github.com/brain-research/tensorfuzz
7https://help.aliyun.com/product/53258.html
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Figure 8: Aliyun Image Recognition API. Left: clean image. Right: adversarial image.
know how many and cannot enumerate all labels. (iii) The API only outputs
scores for up to 5 top labels. The scores do not sum to one. They are neither
probabilities nor logits.
In this experiment, we adapt the parameter settings in Section 4.3. We
set the perturbation distance bound to be  = 0.1 and perform an untargeted
generation with a budget of 5000 queries to the target API. We use API’s
top-1 prediction of the original image as the fitness. The algorithm early
terminates when the top-1 prediction change.
23
4.4.1. Results
Our approach achieves a 92% success rate against the Aliyun API on an
ImageNet sample set of 25 images. Some adversarial samples against the
image recognition API are given in Figure 8. The left part is the original
predictions, showing that the API correctly classifies clean images with high
confidence. The right part is the adversarial predictions, showing adversarial
samples mislabeled by the API. For example, the sign image with a 97%
confidence score is misclassified as a restaurant, while the two images look
very similar. Overall, we successfully trigger the Aliyun API misbehavior
with perturbed images.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce Differential Evolution and develop a new type
of black-box adversarial sample generation method called BMI-FGSM. We
generate adversarial samples that are hard to detect and successfully attack
DNNs on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet. We propose two mechanisms,
double step size and candidate reuse, to be the essential part of our black-
box method and conduct experiments to validate their efficacy. Experimental
results show that our approach obtains success rate, perturbation distance,
and transferability comparable to the state-of-the-art white-box techniques
while reducing the time consumption of black-box method considerably. It
even achieves similar performance to a white-box method on a large dataset.
Finally, we craft adversarial samples for the Aliyun Image Recognition API
and expose its robustness problem, demonstrating that our approach is able
to test real-world third-party systems from the perspective of the attacker.
Future work includes testing models with defense techniques or models in
other areas. This work also opens up new opportunities on how to combine
adversarial techniques with evolutionary algorithms like Differential Evolu-
tion.
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